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Foreign Investment Arbitration and Joint Ventures
by Daryl Rodney Buffenstein*
I. Introduction
The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States (the Convention)' was opened for
signature on March 18, 1966 and entered into force on October 14, 1966.
The Convention established the International Centre for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) as an ancillary organization within the
World Bank Group. 2 The purpose behind the Convention and the es-
tablishment of ICSID was to encourage the flow of capital to less devel-
oped countries (LDCs) by providing an impartial international forum for
the resolution of disputes between foreign investors and host govern-
ments. The availability of such a forum would enable these governments
to demonstrate a favorable and stable attitude towards foreign investors
by indicating in advance their willingness to permit investors to resort to
the Centre, thus vastly improving the investment climate in areas of the
world where such investment was most needed to facilitate economic de-
velopment.
Prior to the formulation of the Convention, there was a lack of both
convenient facilities for the settlement of disputes between states and pri-
vate persons3 and of a mechanism to ensure that an agreement by a state
to arbitrate would be honored. 4 An investor who found no satisfactory
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ciate, Kilpatrick & Cody, Georgia; B.A.,'Economics and Comparative African Government and
Law 1972, University of Cape Town; B.L. with honors 1974, L.L.B. 1975, University of Rhode-
sia; L.L.M., International Business Law 1977, University of Exeter; Commonwealth Scholar
1975-76.
I 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter cited as the Convention]. The text,
along with a complete history of the Convention, may also be found in INTERNATIONAL CEN-
TRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF IN-
VESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES: ANALYSIS OF
DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE FORMATION OF THE CONVENTION (1970).
2 The Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(1).
3 The Permanent Court of Arbitration is an exception to this. In February 1962 the
Secretariat of the Permanent Court issued a set of rules for settlement of international disputes
between two parties of which only one is a state. Nevertheless, the non-binding nature of the
proceedings provided thereby is an obvious and severe shortcoming.
4 See Memorial of the United Kingdom, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, I.C.J. Pleadings 86
(1952). The irrevocability of consent to arbitration, provided for by art. 25(1) of the Conven-
tion is probably its most outstanding feature.
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redress through the exercise of local remedies in the host state was thus
obliged to either abandon his claim or seek the protection of his national
state, with all the attendant political uncertainties that process involves. 5
An important reason for the success of the Convention in attracting
support within the international community of states is that it ap-
proaches the problem of encouragement and protection of foreign invest-
ment on a procedural plane. Earlier attempts to formulate multilateral
conventions containing substantive rules on the protection of foreign
property 6 failed to gain significant international acceptance.
That a substantial number of states have become parties to the Con-
vention indicates that it has been well received. As of August 15, 1979,
eighty states had signed the Convention, of which seventy-five had de-
posited instruments of ratification. 7 Particularly conspicuous absentees
from the list of signatories to the Convention are the Latin American
countries en bloc." The non-membership of these countries may be one of
the most significant detractions from the general effectiveness of the Con-
vention as a mechanism for improving the flow of investment since these
are countries where the risks of expropriation or nationalization have
been especially high. Other notable absentees are India, Spain, and the
countries belonging to the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
(COMECON). On the other hand, the African countries are extremely
well represented, as are numerous Asian and Middle Eastern countries
and the developed Western countries.9
5 The investor's state, even where its national's claim is self-evident, may be unwilling to
prejudice its relations with the host state. Moreover, where it is decided that protection should
be given, a plethora of problems arise, among them, the problem of inducing the host state to
submit to the jurisdiction of an international tribunal.
6 See the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments Abroad, April 1959, reprintedin
9 J.P.L. (1960), and the OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, No.
23801, Oct. 12, 1967, reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 117 (1968). See also G. SCHWARTZENBERGER, FOR-
EIGN INVESTMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 109-34, 153-69 (1969).
7 13 ICSID ANN. REP. 3 (1978/79).
8 This is mainly attributable to the high premium placed on the concept of absolute
sovereignty by these countries. See generally Szasz, The Investment Dtputes Convention and Latin
Amertca, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 256 (1971).
9 It has been argued that while the widespread acceptance of the Convention is at least
one indication of its success, the fact that few disputes have actually been registered with the
Centre for arbitration demonstrates that the Convention is not widely used and has therefore
not added significantly to the improvement of the investment climate in LDCs. See Mirabito,
The United Nattons Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.- The First
Four Years, 5 GA. L. INT'L & COMP. L. 471, 484 (1975). It is true that the Centre has been seized
with only nine arbitral disputes since its inception, see II ICSID ANN. REP. 32 (1976/77), 12
ICSID ANN. REP. 5 (1977/78), 13 ICSID ANN. REP. 5 (1978/79), but this may also be con-
strued as an indication of its effectiveness since the very acceptance of the mechanisms available
should provide an inducement to parties to attempt to resolve their disputes amicably. More-
over, an increasing number of bilateral investment protection agreements between states con-
tain references to ICSID as does a steadily increasing volume of legislation in LDCs for the
encouragement and regulation of foreign investments. See Provisions Relating to ICSID in In-
ternational Agreements and National Investment Laws. ICSID Doc./9/Rev. 2. Perhaps the
most accurate measure of the influence of the Convention would be the the large number of
investment contracts containing clauses consenting to the jurisdiction of the Centre which are
known to have been concluded. A. BROCHES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
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The provisions of the Convention and the organization and func-
tioning of the Centre have been commented upon and explained in a
proliferation of recent literature.' 0 The purpose of this study is to focus
on the jurisdictional articles of the Convention with reference to the
jurisdiction ratione personae of the Centre where the non-state party to an
investment agreement is a consortium or joint venture incorporated in
the host state party. In view of the increasing use of the joint venture as
a mechanism for investment, this is a situation likely to become increas-
ingly prevalent. An analysis of the Convention in this light reveals po-
tential problems of some complexity, an awareness of which may assist
prospective foreign investors and their legal advisors in formulating
agreements and approaches that will avoid, or at least minimize, the risk
of pitfalls at the dispute settlement stage."
Section II of this paper comments on the expanding rule of joint
ventures in international investment and reviews briefly some of the
problems and issues inherent in such enterprises. Sections III and IV,
respectively, provide a concise outline of the jurisdiction of the Centre
and a discussion of the definition of corporate nationality in terms of the
Convention. These sections are germane to a complete understanding of
the potential jurisdictional problems involved where a joint venture is a
party to an investment agreement with the host state in which it is incor-
porated. These potential problems are examined in Section V and cer-
tain possible interpretative solutions are canvassed. In the final section,
the troublesome nationality requirement is reconsidered and the neces-
sity of its inclusion in the Convention re-examined.
II. The Trend Towards Joint Ventures as a Mechanism for
Investment
The term "joint venture"' 12 has been used to describe both the situa-
DOCUMENTS AND COLLECTED PAPERS 292, 299 (1974). Mr. Broches estimated that the volume
of investments covered by ICSID clauses runs into "several thousands of millions of dollars."
10 See Broches, The Convention of the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
ofOther States, II RECUEIL DES COURs 331 (1972); Szasz, A Practical Guide to the Convention on the
Settlement of lnvestment Dirputes, 1 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1968); Szasz, The Investment Disputes
Convention-Opportunites and Pitfalls, 5 J.L. & ECON. DEv. 23 (1970). A bibliography of the
publications on the Convention is available from the Centre on request.
I In a significant number of cases involving joint ventures, the joint venture will not be a
party to an investment agreement with the host state but will rather constitute the subject
matter of an investment agreement between a foreign investor and the host state, in which it is
agreed that a venture be established and operated by both parties to the agreement. The scope
of this article is not of direct relevance to those cases. Rather, the analysis focuses on the situa-
tion where a joint venture is a party to an investment agreement with the host state, and on
whether and in what circumstances the Centre will be able to exercise personal jurisdiction over
such venture.
12 "Joint venture" and "consortium" have been used interchangeably to denote the situa-
tion described in the text. See Comment, InternationalJoint Venture Corporations: Drafting of Control
Arrangements, 1963 DUKE L.J. 516, 516 n.2. Regarding consortia, see generally A. BOULTON,
BUSINESS CONSORTIA (1961). On joint ventures in developing countries, see generally JOINT
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES (W. Friedmann & G. Kalmanoff, eds. 1961); W. FRIED-
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tion where two or more enterprises enter into a loose form of association,
often analagous to a partnership, for the purpose of cooperation on a
specific project or in a particular area of business,' 3 and that where two
or more enterprises organize, cause to be incorporated, and hold shares
in, a new enterprise. This paper concerns itself only with the latter type
of joint venture, in particular the case where one or more foreign investor
enterprises, often together with local enterprises in a capital receiving
country, jointly established, own and control an enterprise incorporated
in that country.
In the context of private foreign investment in less developed coun-
tries, only within the last two decades has the joint capital venture re-
ceived more than scant attention. However, it is rapidly assuming a
position of considerable significance both quantitatively and qualita-
tively in the overall flow of investment to LDCs. No precise information
exists as to the extent of foreign investments made in the form of joint
ventures or what percentage of the earnings from private foreign invest-
ment in LDCs is attributable to joint ventures. Nevertheless, it is appar-
ent that joint ventures have increasingly become "the most important
form of foreign investment in the developing countries of Africa, Asia
and Latin America.' 4 Moreover, there is evidence that the most rapidly
growing type of joint venture, at least for U.S. foreign investors, is the
"minority joint venture," in which the foreign investor holds between ten
and forty-nine percent of the equity in the joint enterprise.' 5 The
number of joint ventures in which there are several foreign participants
from different countries has also vastly increased in recent years 16 and
comprises investments in the many varied fields of manufacturing and
raw materials. The multipartite joint venture may be a consortium of
international firms incorporated in a host state for the purpose of a spe-
cific project or investment, although in a growing number of cases pri-
vate local interests in that state will participate, as might the government
of that state. 1
7
MANN & J. BEGUIN, JOINT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(1971).
I3 This closely corresponds to the contractual "joint venture" of American law, a special
combination of parties without any actual partnership or corporate designation. W. FRIED-
MANN & J. BEGUIN, supra note 12, at 22. Use of non-equity joint ventures has also increased in
international trade cooperation. Id. at 412; see Horbaczewski, Profitable Co-Excitence." The Legal
Foundaton for Joint Enterprise with United States Participation in Polang 31 Bus. LAW. 433, 442
(1975); Lew, Aspects ofEast-West Trade.- A Panel, 124 NEW L.J. 601, 603 (1974).
14 W. FRIEDMANN &J. BEGUIN, supra note 12, at 3.
I5 Liebman, The Tax Treatment ofJoint Venture Income Under Subpart F: Somes Issues and Alter-
natives, 32 Bus. LAw. 341, 349 (1977).
16 W. FRIEDMANN & J. BEGUIN, supra note 12, at 19-21. See also Financial Times, April 4,
1977, at 6, col. 4.
17 The reasons for the increased interest in joint ventures are various, depending on the
circumstances in each case. There may be purely commercial reasons, e.g., insufficient capital
prompting associations with local or other partners, a desire to diversify by spreading invest-
ment capital, the availability of a partner who can provide easier access to local government or
financial institutions. There also may be political reasons, e.g., a joint venture with local capital
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The exact extent of participation of each "partner" to a joint ven-
ture and the profit sharing formula adopted will differ according to the
circumstances.18 Of more particular relevance to this paper, however, is
the question of control of joint ventures.
It has been said of the relationship between a company and its sub-
sidiary:
To lawyers a business is or is not controlled abroad by virtue of its 100,
51, 48, or some such numerical percentage of foreign ownership in a
cohesive voting bloc. To a student of industrial management, control is
not an either-or proposition, but a question of infinite degrees of divisi-
bility, depending on the nature of the decision making process and the
division of authority between the head office and the foreign unit. This
control may cover any or all of a variety of separate functions . . . A
company can control all phases of a subsidiary's operations with merely
25 percent of the equity .... 19
These comments are obviously applicable to joint ventures. There are
various devices by which equity ownership can be divorced from con-
trol20 and the choice of any one or a combination of these will depend on
the business and legal environment in which the venture must operate
and on the respective bargaining power of the parties. 21 The following
are only a few of the devices that may be used: assignment of different
classes of shares with different voting rights; division of the board of di-
rectors into two classes of directors elected or nominated by the holders
of different shares; rights given to only one class of shareholders to nomi-
nate a managing director with specially defined but broad powers; and
most importantly, "management" or "technical assistance" contracts en-
tered into between the joint venture and one of the partners, granting
that partner, whatever his equity share, the right to control absolutely
may lessen or delay the risk of nationalization or expropriation. In fact, the investment legisla-
tion of an increasing number of LDCs now either offers positive tax incentives for association
with local capital, see, e.g., Lesotho Investment Guide (Lesotho Embassy, London), or makes
such association mandatory, as in the case of the Zambian copper mining industry, see R.
BROWN & M. FABER, SOME POLICY AND LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING MINING LEGISLATION AND
AGREEMENTS IN AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES (1977). Planned divestment in terms
of which foreign equity participation is gradually transferred to locals in accordance with a
fixed and pre-determined plan, has also recently received some attention, especially in the An-
dean Common Market. See Abbott, Bargaining Power and Strategy in the Foreign Investment focess.:
A Current Andean Code Analysis, 3 SYRACUSE INT'L L. & CoM. 319 (1975). For the advantages of
this system, see A. HUSCHMANN, ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 76 (1969).
18 See generally W. FRIEDMANN & J. BEGUIN, supra note 12. With regard to mineral agree-
ments in particular, see Smith & Wells, Mineral Agreements in Developing Countires: Structures and
Substance, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 560 (1975). A concise introduction to profit sharing in joint ven-
tures can be found in D. DE DELUPIS, FINANCE AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS IN DEVEL-
OPING COUNTRIES (1973). The present writer is indebted to the legal department of the United
Africa Company International, members of which kindly made available various joint venture
agreements for inspection.
19 C. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 404 (1963).
20 See Ross, The Foretgn Joint Venture Corporation. Some Legal and Business Considerations, 45
DEN. L.J. 4 (1968); Comment, supra note 12, at 516.
21 See Abbott, supra note 17 (analysis of the determinants of bargaining power in similar
situations).
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certain spheres of the venture.22
Although the fifty-fifty joint venture is not rare, in most cases where
there are only two partners in a venture one of them will have a leading
role in terms of control. The problem of control in a multipartite joint
venture may be very different. Although one of the partners may legally
have decisive control, in many such ventures the partners will not be
willing or able to concede such a role to any particular partner, it being
considered inappropriate for any single shareholder to have a majority
participation and the control of the board. A working arrangement is
then necessary to ensure the smooth day-to-day running of the venture. 23
Control must not be seen purely in terms of legal rights and duties,
whatever form these may take. In certain industries or sectors, for exam-
ple, a partner's technical superiority may give him defacto control over a
venture in which he has a minority position in terms of equity shares and
legal control. 2 4
In view of the parallel trends toward both minority and multipartite
joint ventures, and the importance of the joint venture as a mechanism
for investment, the following sections will examine the jurisdictional arti-
cles of the Convention for the purpose of identifying certain problems
that may arise in connection with joint ventures.
III. The Jurisdiction of the Centre--A General Outline
The first stage at which jurisdictional questions might arise is that of
registration of a request for conciliation or arbitration proceedings. 25
Such a request must contain information as to the issue in dispute, the
identity of the parties, and their consent to arbitration or conciliation. 26
The Secretary-General is obliged to register it unless he finds, on the ba-
sis of the information contained in the request, that the dispute is "mani-
fest/y outside the jurisdiction of the Centre."' 27 Registration may be
refused only where jurisdiction is patently lacking, for example, where
there is quite clearly no consent or the state party is not a contracting
state.28 Where there is any doubt whatsoever the dispute must be regis-
tered and the doubts settled at the second stage, by the commission or
22 See generally W. FRIEDMANN & J. BEGUIN, supra note 12, at 385; Smith & Wells, supra
note 18, at 581.
23 See generally W. FRIEDMANN &J. BEGUIN, supra note 12, at 385.
24 I.
25 The Centre does not itself conciliate or arbitrate. These proceedings are administered
by the Centre and conducted by tribunals and commissions appointed in accordance with the
Convention. As the Directors' Report, ICSID DOCUMENTS, REPORT. OF THE EXECUTIVE Di-
RECTORS ON THE CONVENTION (1967) [hereinafter cited as DIRECTORS' REPORT], indicates,
the term "jurisdiction of the Centre" is used as a "convenient expression to mean the limits
within which the provisions of the Convention will apply and the facilities of the Centre will be
available for conciliation and arbitration proceedings." Id. 22.
26 The Convention, supra note I, arts. 28(2) (conciliation), 36(2) (arbitration).
27 Id. arts. 28(3), 36(3) (emphasis added).
28 The Secretary-General is given this limited power to "screen" requests with a view to
avoiding embarrassment to a party that had clearly not consented and to prevent the Centre's
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tribunal. Tribunals and commissions are judges of their own competence
and will consider and determine any objection that a dispute is not
within the jurisdiction of the Centre or for any other reasons is not within
their competence. 29 Such objection will normally be raised by the tribu-
nal or commission on its own initiative.30
The mere fact that a state has ratified the Convention does not bind
that state to arbitrate or conciliate all disputes with foreign investors.
Consent is in each case "the cornerstone of the jurisdiction of the Cen-
tre. ' '3 l However, once consent is given by both parties it is binding and
cannot be unilaterally withdrawn. 32 Moreover, consent to arbitration
under the Convention "shall unless otherwise stated be deemed to be
consent to such arbitration to the exclusion of any other remedy." A
state may, however, require the exhaustion of local administrative or ju-
dicial remedies as a condition of its consent. 33 As to the form and timing
of the consent, the Convention prescribes only that it must be in writing
and that it must exist by the time the Centre is seized. 34 Thus consent
need not be expressed by both parties in a single instrument and the host
state's consent may be indicated in a bilateral investment protection
agreement with the investor's state, or in its national investment legisla-
tion.35 Equally, consent may be given in a compromis after the dispute has
arisen. In the majority of cases consent will be given in a clause compromis-
soire in the original investment agreement between the parties. In these
cases it is advisable for the parties, with foresight and careful drafting, to
provide for various contingencies and options in connection with their
submission to ICSID jurisdiction. In order to facilitate this the Centre
has prepared a set of Model Clauses for use as part of, or in conjunction
with, the consent clause. 36
Although the consent of the parties is the necessary prerequisite to
the exercise of jurisdiction by the Centre, consent alone is not sufficient
machinery from being activated where jurisdiction is quite obviously lacking. DIRECTORS' RE-
PORT, supra note 25, 20.
29 The Convention, supra note 1, arts. 32(1), 41(1).
30 ICSID Doc./4, Regulations and Rules: (D) Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Pro-
ceedings, Rule 41(2); (C) Rules of Procedure for Conciliation Proceedings, Rule 30(2).
31 DIRECTORS' REPORT, supra note 25, 23.
32 The Convention, supra note 1, art. 25(1).
33 Id. art. 26.
34 Id. arts. 25(1), 28(3), 36(3).
35 DIRECTORS' REPORT, supra note 25, 24. In cases where the consent is not expressed in
a single instrument there may be complications in determining mutality of consent. See
Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Dputes Some Observations on Jurzsdiction, 5
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263, 269 (1966).
36 ICSID Doc./5 (1968), Model Clauses Recording Consent to the Jurisdiction of the In-
ternational Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes [hereinafter cited as Model
Clauses]. See generally Amerasinghe, Model Clauses for Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes, 28
ARB. J. 232 (1973). These clauses are especially important since, while there are certain matters
regarding which agreement between the parties will not compensate for defective jurisdiction,
there are many instances in which agreement can create or strengthen jurisdiction. See text
accompanying note 10 in/fa. It is important that these matters are foreseen and provided for in
properly drafted clauses.
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to found jurisdiction since the jurisdiction of the Centre is further limited
by reference to the nature of the dispute and the parties thereto.
With regard to the nature of the dispute, the Convention prescribes
jurisdiction ratione materiae by providing that the dispute must be "a legal
dispute arising directly out of an investment. '3 7
The Convention prescribes jurisdiction radone personae by providing
that one of the parties must be a contracting state (or a constituent sub-
division or agency thereof) and the other party must be a "national of
another Contracting State."13 8 This latter phrase means, by virtue of the
first part of article 25(2)(b),
any juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting State
other than the State party to the dispute on the date on which the par-
ties consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or arbitration
39
The phrase also means, by virtue of the second part of article 25(2)(b),
any juridical person which had the nationality of the Contracting State
party to the dispute on that date and which, because of foreign control,
the parties have agreed should be treated as a national of another Con-
tracting State for the purposes of this Convention.
40
This second part of article 25(2) (b) was inserted to extend the ambit
of the Convention to the considerable volume of international invest-
ment carried out by enterprises incorporated in host States. The lan-
guage and construction of this provision, and its relationship to the first
part of article 25(2)(b), raise significant problems when considering its
application to joint ventures. These will be examined in section V. That
analysis will be facilitated by first examining the meaning of corporate
nationality in international law and in terms of the Convention.
IV. The Concept of Corporate Nationality in the Context of the
Convention
A. General
The Convention does not define or explain the concept of corporate
nationality. Since the Convention is an international legal instrument,
one may well ask whether the prevailing approach of international law
to the question of corporate nationality will be used to interpret the Con-
vention.4 1 In particular, will the controversial principles enunciated by
37 The Convention, supra note 1, art. 25(1). The jurisdiction ratione materiae of the Centre
cannot be examined within the limited scope of this study. See sources cited in note 10 supra.
38 The Convention, supra note 1, art. 25(1).
39 Id. art. 25(2)(b).
4 Id.
41 "The process of interpretation supposes that the parties contemplate a result not incom-
patible with customary international law." 1 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAw 261 (1970).
However, this will be rebutted by evidence of a definite intention to the contrary. In this case
such evidence is clearly provided by the travauxpreparatoires of the Convention. See text accom-
panying note 58 itnfra.
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the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Barcelona Traction case42 be
applied to nationality questions arising under the Convention? In Barce-
lona Traction the ICJ held that incorporation (or location of principal
office) was the sole criterion for determining corporate nationality. The
Court expressly disapproved the theory that nationality could be predi-
cated primarily on ownership or control or that protection could be
given where the enterprise has the nationality of the defendant state.43
The Convention states plainly in article 25 that the private party to the
dispute must be "a national of another Contracting State" but provides
an exception to this in the case of a host state juridical person agreed to
be under foreign control. It is therefore tempting to conclude that this is
the only exception to the Barcelona Traction incorporation principle that
would be countenanced by the Convention.4 4 It is clear, however, that
such an interpretation would be incorrect.
To determine the nationality of juridical persons, the Centre may
apply criteria of ownership and control or any other test.45 Traditional
sources of international law, including decisions of the ICJ, may be
drawn from but are not dispositive. The jurisdiction of the Centre must
be determined by reference to the Convention and its drafting history.
The Preliminary Draft accepted both incorporation and control as crite-
ria of nationality and clearly contemplated the possession of dual nation-
ality of companies where these two criteria lead to divergent
conclusions. 46 This draft included within the definition of "national of a
Contracting State" both an enterprise which under the law of that state
was its national, and an enterprise in which nationals of that state had a
controlling interest. 4 7 The deletion of this definition was not intended to
affirm the incorporation principle but rather to accord discretion to
42 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd., [1970] I.C.J. 3 [hereinafter cited
as Barcelona Traction].
43 [1970] I.CJ. 42, 49. Several judges expressed strong dissatisfaction with this holding.
The issue is one on which the authorities are much divided. See, e.g., 2 D. O'CONNELL, supra
note 41, at 1042-43. The Barcelona Traction decision has been most controversial. See, e.g., I.
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 480 (2d ed. 1973). It has been
strongly argued that, to the extent the decision is acceptable, it should be restricted to its partic-
ular facts, ie., as circumscribing the principles upon which a claim from diplomatic protection
may be based. See Broches, supra note 10, at 360. See also Vuylsteke, Foreign Investment Protection
and ICSID Arbitration 4 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 343, 355-57 (1974). These considerations are
said to be inapplicable under the Convention since, by virtue of article 27, the investor's na-
tional state is prohibited from bringing an international claim in the exercise of diplomatic
protection unless the host state fails to abide by an award rendered against it. Broches, supra
note 10, at 356. This assumption is not necessarily correct as this article will point out. See
section VI of text infra.
44 Expressio unius est excuioso altertis. This technical rule of construction has been referred to
by tribunals in connection with the construction of treaties. See 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 41,
at 253.
45 The tests or "linking factors" that might be used are: incorporation, domicile, siege
soctal, ownership and control. For a discussion of these factors, see 2 D. O'CONNELL, supra note
41, at 1040.
46 Broches, supra note 10, at 359.
47 Id.; ICSID Doc./2, at 230.
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tribunals and commissions which, as judges of their own competence, 48
will attach great weight to the stipulation of the parties to the maximum
extent possible under the Convention.
B. Specficat'on of Nationa/qy in the Consent Agreement
It is notable that the Convention itself does not require that the con-
sent agreement specify the nationality of the investor. However, articles
38, 39 and 52(3) of the Convention establish certain exclusionary rules
relating to the membership of arbitral tribunals and article 27 prevents
the state of which the investor is a national from giving him diplomatic
protection or bringing an international claim.49 Moreover, the Rules of
Procedure for the Institution of Conciliation and Arbitration require
that the request by which proceedings are instituted must include the
nationality of the investor. 50 It would therefore be advisable, in order to
avoid confusion, to specify the nationality of the investor in the invest-
ment agreement, and the Model Clauses provide a clause for this pur-
pose. 5' The use of such a clause cannot remedy any fundamental
disability but will be particularly advantageous in marginal situations or
where there is some doubt as to nationality, for example where the inves-
tor is a dual national of two states other than the host state.5 2 The fol-
lowing examples will assist in clarifying this situation.
Example I: Enterprise E is incorporated in non-Contracting State Y and
is owned and controlled by citizens of that State. E enters into an invest-
ment agreement with Host State and the agreement contains a consent
clause submitting the ICSID jurisdiction and stating that E is a national
of Contracting State X.
Here there can be no doubt that the stipulation of X nationality
cannot serve to cure the obvious jurisdictional defect that E is in fact a
national of a non-contracting state. The jurisdictional defect is absolute
and no agreement between the parties can remedy it.
53
48 The Convention, art. 32, 41.
49 The Convention, art. 27 provides that "[n]o Contracting State shall give diplomatic
protection, or bring an international claim, in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and
another Contracting State shall have consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration
under the Convention, unless such other Contracting State shall have failed to abide by and
comply with the award rendered in such dispute."
50 ICSID Doc./4, (B) Rules of Procedure for the Institution of Conciliation and Arbitra-
tion, Rule 2(l)(d)(i).
51 Model Clauses, supra note 36, $ 14. Clause V provides simply: "It is hereby stipulated
by the parties that the Investor is a national of name of another Contracting State."
52 The problems posed by nationality in the context of foreign-controlled juridical persons
in the host state (art. 25(2)(b)) are dealt with fully in section V of text tn/fa. Note that the use of
the term "enterprise" in this paper is intended to convey precisely the same meaning as that
suggested by the term "juridical person."
53 Note that where the host state and/or the investor's state are not members of the Centre
they may wish to make a contingent submission to ICSID which would come into effect when
the nonmember state becomes a member. Model Clause X provides for such contingent sub-
mission. Model Clause XII provides for an alternative dispute settlement procedure (inevitably
non-binding), should the non-member not become a member before the dispute arises, as far as
possible patterned on the procedure provided for under the Convention.
FOREIGN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
Example II: The facts are as above except that, although E is incorpo-
rated in Y, the holders of 75% of its share capital are individuals who are
citizens of State X and reside in X.
Here, it is submitted, a stipulation that E is a national of X will
assist the tribunal or commission in retaining jurisdiction. In light of the
discussion above, it is clear that the Centre is entitled to assume jurisdic-
tion on the basis of any of the various tests54 or a combination of these
and is not limited to the incorporation test. This should be so even in the
absence of a stipulation as to nationality, but in marginal cases, for ex-
ample if the connection with X were somewhat weaker, such stipulation
would serve to bolster possible jurisdictional weaknesses. In this regard it
is to be hoped that commissions and tribunals will take the widest possi-
ble view of their competence and assume jurisdiction wherever there is a
tenable connection between an enterprise and a contracting state.
55
What if the host state party, having previously agreed that the in-
vestor is a national of contracting state X, now objects to jurisdiction on
the grounds that the investor has more connections with non-contracting
state Y and that it is therefore more appropriately a national of Y? In
this situation, the host state should be estopped from denying that the
investor is a national of X, providing that at the time of consent the host
state was in no way misled by the investor and was fully aware of the
respective connections of the latter to X and Y.
In would be quite inappropriate to allow the principle of estoppel to
be invoked in situations such as Example I above, since in such a case the
jurisdictional defect is absolute and would inevitably be raised by the
tribunal or commission mero motu. Indeed, such a case would probably
not proceed past the "screening power" of the Secretary-General, except
for the fact that this power may be exercised only on the basis of the
information contained in the request 56 and the nationality stated in the
request will obviously accord with that stipulated in the agreement. In
cases where the jurisdictional defect is relative, however, and where juris-
dictional weaknesses are bolstered by a stipulation of nationality, it is
submitted that in view of the importance of consent and on general prin-
ciples of good faith, consistency, and practicability, the principle of es-
toppel should and will be accorded a proper place in the jurisprudence of
the Centre.57
54 Eg., incorporation, domicile, siege social, control.
55 See section V of text infra.
56 The Convention, arts. 28(3), 36(3).
57 The question of the law to be applied under the Convention cannot be fully examined
within the limited confines of this paper. For a fuller analysis see J. CHERIAN, INVESTMENT
CONTRACTS AND ARBITRATION (1975). Note that ICSID tribunals are to decide disputes in
accordance with such rules of law as the parties may agree upon. In the absence of such an
agreement, the law to be applied is that of the host state party (including its conflict rules) and
such rules of international law as may be applicable. The Convention, art. 42. There is abun-
dant authority to support the proposition that estoppel is a general principle of international
law. See Broches, supra note 10, at 390. Although the principle has no particular coherence in
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C Nationaty and Foreign Controlled Enterprises
Certain problems remain regarding the relationship between the
two parts of article 25(2)(b), and the fact that the word "nationality" is
included in each of these provisions but defined in neither of them. Is the
reference to "nationality" in article 25(2)(b) (second part) intended to
convey precisely the same meaning as the reference to it in article
25(2)(b) (first part)? If so, and since it has been noted that nationality
under the Convention can be predicated upon ownership and control as
well as upon incorporation, is the second part of article 25(2)(b) neces-
sary at all?
It is clear from the travaux preparatories of the Convention that the
second part of article 25(2)(b) was inserted to put it beyond doubt that a
foreign controlled juridical person incorporated in the host state should
not by mere reason of such incorporation be excluded from the Centre's
jurisdiction, provided there is agreement that it should be treated as a
national of another contracting state.58 The necessity for this provision
must be seen in the light of a strong concern on the part of many LDCs
that states should not be internationally arraigned by their own nationals
and that an enterprise incorporated in the host state should automati-
cally be excluded from the jurisdiction ratione personae of the Centre, irre-
spective of the ownership or control of that enterprise. 59
Despite the fact, therefore, that nationality under the Convention is
not limited to the incorporation test, the drafting history of article 25
strongly suggests that in the absence of the second part of article 25(2)(b)
all enterprises incorporated in the host state party would have been ex-
cluded from the jurisdiction ratione personae of the Centre. Seen in the
context of its drafting history, article 25(2) (b) (second part) is intended to
permit jurisdiction to be exercised where it would not otherwise exist in
terms of article 25(2)(b) (first part) because of host state nationality, but
also making the exercise of jurisdiction in such a case dependent upon
the additional criterion of an agreement between the parties that the
enterprise will be treated as a national of another contracting state be-
cause of foreign control.
Though the word "nationality" in the phrase "nationality of the
Contracting State party to the dispute" in article 25(2)(b) (second part)
was inserted with the criterion of incorporation specifically in mind, this
should not be the exclusive criterion for nationality in relation to this
particular provision. If, according to the criteria of ownership and con-
trol, an enterprise is clearly a national of the host state though not incor-
porated therein, the drafting history indicates that agreement on foreign
international law, the effects and incidents of the principle not being uniform, there is no reason
why it should not apply to individuals or to juridical persons. Id. at 390, 618.
58 Broches, supra note 10, at 358-59; Masood,jurt~dtion of lnternational Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes 14 J. INDIAN L. INST. 119, 138 (1972).
59 Broches, supra note 10, at 359.
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control should still be necessary. 6° Where, in accordance with either the
incorporation test or the ownership and control test, an enterprise is a
national of the host state party, that enterprise should fall into the cate-
gory of juridical persons contemplated by the second part of article
25(2) (b).
With the above considerations in mind, the personal jurisdiction of
the Centre over joint ventures incorporated in host states will now be
considered. This analysis will raise further difficulties presented by the
nationality requirement, which will be returned to in the concluding sec-
tion of this article.
V. The Jurisdiction Ratione Personae of the International Centre
over Joint Ventures
A. "Foreign Control'" Atnority Joint Ventures and the Meaning of
Control
The Convention offers no definition or explanation of the term "for-
eign control." A threshold question is whether foreign control is to be
subjectively or objectively determined. Is it sufficient for the parties to
agree to treat the host state enterprise as a national of another con-
tracting state because of an element of foreign control which in their
opinion warrants this treatment? Can mere agreement as to foreign con-
trol confer jurisdiction or must a certain degree of foreign control inde-
pendently exist?
The travauxpreparatoires of the Convention reveal that the draft con-
tained a provision to the effect that any judicial person with host state
nationality could be treated as "a national of another Contracting State"
purely on the basis of an agreement by the parties to this effect. 6' This
provision induced the fear on the part of several LDCs that juridical
person wholly owned and controlled by host state nationals could thus
remove itself from the jurisdiction of host state courts and control by the
host state. Host state agreement would have been necessary in order for
this to occur, but the fear seems to have been that large local enterprises
with dominant bargaining power might have been able to secure this
consent.
In deference to these objections, the words "the parties have agreed
should be treated as a national of another Contracting State" were
60 An example of this would be an enterprise in which nationals of the host state hold 85%
equity and have the business management, nationals of contracting state X hold 15% and have
the technical management, while the enterprise is incorporated in any third contracting or non-
contracting state. That the Convention has inherent flexibility and that the Centre can deter-
mine nationality in accordance with any of various criteria are desirable. In certain circum-
stances, however, it is bound to cause uncertainty. Investors would therefore be well-advised to
insert an agreement-on-foreign-control stipulation into the consent clause whenever the investor
enterprise, despite its incorporation in another contracting state, happens to have a certain
amount of equity held by nationals of the host state.
61 Draft Convention, art. 30 (iii), ICSID Doc./2 (pt. 1) 624 (1970).
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prefixed with the words "because of foreign control" in the final text. 62
The addition of these words mandates the conclusion that "foreign con-
trol" cannot be totally subjectively determined. Where diversity of na-
tionality is totally absent, as in the case of a company incorporated in the
host state and wholly owned and controlled by host state nationals, no
amount of agreement can confer jurisdiction.
Since "foreign control" must objectively exist, what meaning is to be
attributed to this term? A wholly owned subsidiary of a foreign investor
enterprise will obviously be subject to foreign control. A joint venture in
the host state in which such foreign investor enterprise has a decisive
voice in management and holds a majority equity participation would
also clearly qualify. In minority or equal participation joint ventures,
however, the interpretation of "foreign control" is crucial in determining
the scope of the Centre's jurisdiction. As pointed out above, control is
not an either-or proposition but a question of infinite degrees of divisibil-
ity. It must be determined what degree of control will, when coupled
with the parties' agreement, suffice to confer jurisdiction by virtue of the
second part of article 25(2)(b).
In the travaux preparaloires and subsequent legal literature there is
little discussion concerning the extent or degree of control which, when
coupled with agreement, will be sufficient to give the Centre jurisdiction.
It seems to have been assumed that in most cases the foreign control
would be majority control. 63 As shown above, however, equity shares are
often an inaccurate measure of control over an enterprise, and this was
echoed by one of the legal experts formulating the Convention. 64 There
are numerous devices by which equity ownership can be disassociated
from control and, in these circumstances, the lack of definition as to what
constitutes "foreign control" frees the parties to agree to treat as such
"any objectively verifiable financial or administrative situation."'65
Tribunals and commissions, as judges of their own competence, 66 have
considerable discretion and it is to be hoped that they will exercise it so
that, provided there is at least an element of "control," jurisdiction will
not be declined. 67 "Control," for the purposes of the Convention, may
constitute something less than the ability to block changes instigated by
the non-foreign partner. To decide otherwise would be to deny investors
the protection of the Convention in circumstances in which one overall
62 This change was made at the suggestion of the U.S. legal expert, but without sufficient
explanatory discussion. See ICSID Doc./2 (pt. 2) 837 (1970).
63 But see Szasz, supra note 10, at 23, 24, where the author recognizes this problem.
64 See the Eighth Session of the Consultative Meeting of Legal Experts on Feb. 7, 1964,
ICSID Doc./2 (pt. 1) 359 (1970).
65 See Masood, supra note 58, at 139.
66 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
other States, opened for signature March 15, 1965, arts. 32(1) and 41(1), 17 U.S.T. 1270,
T.I.A.S. No. 6090.
67 This question, like other problems discussed thfra in connection with multipartite joint
ventures, has not yet arisen in the disputes that have been registered with the Centre.
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aim of the Convention-the flow of resources in the form of capital,
know-how and facilities to LDCs-is being satisfied. Control is both a
question of law and of fact; it is to be expected that in borderline cases
the total situation will be analyzed to determine whether sufficient "con-
trol" exists.
Where the host state has agreed, because of foreign control, to treat
a joint venture organized under its laws as a national of another con-
tracting state, it will probably be estopped from denying that the control
exercised by the foreign partners to the venture is sufficient to confer
jurisdiction.68 It is for the tribunals and commissions, then, to judge
whether the control is sufficient. They may be expected to judge their
competence in a liberal manner, attaching great weight to the overall
purpose of the Convention and the consensual nature of that instrument.
Nevertheless, where the foreign investor feels that the venture in
which he is involved represents a marginal situation in terms of the for-
eign control criterion (e.g., he has a marketing agreement, only twenty
percent equity and a minority or no voice in management), it may be
advisable for him to enter into a separate agreement with the host gov-
ernment in which the latter consents to submit to ICSID any disputes
arising out of the agreement between it and the joint venture. This expe-
dient of a separate "guarantee" agreement would render agreement on
foreign control superfluous and cut through the potential jurisdictional
tangles which could otherwise ensue.
B. Foreign Control Multi'partiteJoint Ventures and Choice of
Nati'onahy
The wording of the second part of article 25(2) (b) may give rise to
further and more complex problems in cases concerning multipartite
joint ventures, particularly where the foreign share of a joint venture is
held by two or more enterprises which have different nationalities.
There is no requirement in the Convention itself that the agreement
on foreign control must identify the country whose nationals exercise
that control or that the control must be exercised by nationals of only
one particular state. However, the Model Clauses recommend that the
agreement on foreign control identify the nationality of the controlling
interest, "especially so if such control is exercised by nationals of several
foreign countries-in which case there may be an advantage in identify-
ing only one of these or perhaps in mentioning some or all."'69 This is
wise counsel since nationality is dispositive of a variety of important
questions such as eligibility for membership of arbitral tribunals and re-
68 Of course, where the foreign investor has minimal control the host state will probably
not consent to ICSID jurisdiction.
69 The Model Clauses provide: "It is hereby agreed, that although name of investor is a
national of the Host it is controlled by nationals of name(s) of other Contracting State(s) and
shall be treated as a national of (that)/(those) State(s) for the purposes of the Convention."
Model Clauses, supra note 36, 16, Clause VI.
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strictions on the state of which the investor is a national. Moreover, the
Rules of Procedure for the Institution of Proceedings provide that the
request for registration of a dispute must contain, in the case of a foreign
controlled host state juridical person, data on the agreement on foreign
control 70 supported by documentation. 7'
Article 25(2)(b) poses no intractable problems where there are sev-
eral foreign partners in a joint venture, even where these partners are
nationals of different states, providing these states are contracting states.
The situation becomes more complex where some or all of the foreign
interest is held by foreign investors who are nationals of non-contracting
states. 72 Some hypothetical examples may serve to illustrate a number of
potential problems concerning the operation of the second part of article
25(2)(b) in this connection and in relation to foreign control in general.
Example III. JV is an enterprise incorporated in Host State pursuant to
an agreement between A, B and C (foreign enterprises being nationals of
Staes X, Y, and Z respectively) and L (one or more private businessmen
in Host State). A, B and C each hold 30% of the equity and L holds the
remaining 10%. A, B and C are represented on the board of directors.
However, B has effective managerial control pursuant to a 'management
contract' between it and JV, and C has control of the technical opera-
tions of the venture by virtue of a 'technical services contract' between it
and JV, but both Y and Z are non-Contracting States. A has a market-
ing agreement with JV and X is a Contracting State. The investment
agreement between JV and Host contains a consent clause in which the
parties agree to submit any disputes arising out of the investment con-
tract to ICSID. The consent clause also contains the following stipula-
70 ICSID Doc./4, (B) Rules of Procedure for the Institution of Conciliation and Arbitra-
tion. Rule 2(I)(d)(iii).
71 Id. Rule 2(2).
72 This is of potential significance despite the fact that the Western industralized countries
are so well represented on the ICSID membership list. Note that the Convention applies to
investments in contracting states made by nationals of other contracting states whether or not
the latter are less developed or developed countries. The Centre is thus available for the settle-
ment of disputes arising from so-called "transatlantic investments." See Brandon, 6 Dirroto
Negli Scambi, Internazionali No. 4,397, 404 (Dec. 1967).
As economic development progresses it is most likely that investments by "less developed
countries" in other less developed countries will assume an increasing proportion of the volume
of international investment. The LDCs of the Middle East are an example of countries which
have become capital exporters. For a case study of a joint venture in a LDC which has itself
promoted and become a partner in yet another joint ventures, see W. FRIEDMANN & J. BEGUIN,
supra note 12, at 151-66. In this context, the absence from the membership list of the Latin
American countries becomes even more significant.
In addition, it has been observed that the Eastern bloc socialist countries are also not con-
tracting states. In view of the trend towards East-West economic cooperation, the ramifications
of increased East-West trade might be felt in the North-South arena. Multipartite joint ven-
tures in LDCs in which Western and Eastern trading interests participate are perhaps more in
the realm of practical possibility than of wild conjecture. Westinghouse Corp., for example, was
negotiating a multi-million-dollar joint venture for the exploitation of uranium deposits in
Somalia, in which an East European "business concern" was to participate. Int'l Herald Trib-
une, May 28-29, 1977, at 2, col. 4.
Note that an entity, in order to qualify as a "national of another Contracting State" for the
purposes of article 25 need not be a privately owned enterpries. A government-owned corpora-
tion is said to qualify so long as it is not discharging "an essentially government function" or
acting directly "as an agent for the government." See Broches, supra note 10, at 354-55.
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tion: "It is hereby agreed that, although JV is a national of the Host, it
is controlled by nationals of X State and shall be treated as a national of
that State for the purpose of the Convention."
Example IV. The facts are as in Example III except that B and C (being
incorporated in non-Contracting States Y and Z respectively and being
wholly owned and controlled by shareholders who are nationals of those
States) are the only foreign partners in JV, so that the respective equity
holdings are B, 45%; C, 45%; L, 10%. The agreement on foreign control
is precisely the same, as Example III, attributing X nationality to the
foreign partners.
These examples raise several questions. In Example IV, it might at
first glance appear that the Centre would be able to exercise jurisdiction
rationepersonae over JV. The second part of article 25(2)(b) provides only
that the parties may, because of foreign control, agree to treat an enter-
prise which is a national of the host as a national of another contracting
state and is completely silent on the question of nationality of the con-
trolling interest. Strictly speaking, therefore, the provision places no re-
strictions on the choice of foreign nationality based on foreign control. 73
It has been contended, however, that the legal policy implicit in the juris-
dictional articles of the Convention prohibits unreasonable choices of na-
tionality. 74 It is submitted that this is the only satisfactory way in which
article 25(2)(b) can be interpreted. To assume jurisdiction where the'for-
eign investors exercising the control have no connection whatsoever with
the state whose nationals they purport to be would be to permit use of
the Convention in circumstances in which it was clearly not intended to
apply. Therefore, not only must the nationality chosen be that of a con-
tracting state, but the choice of that particular contracting state nation-
ality must be a reasonable one in the circumstances. In accordance with
these principles the choice of nationality in Example IV is obviously an
unreasonable one and will not serve to found jurisdiction.
The situation envisaged by Example III is less clear cut and it raises
more difficult questions. Here one of the foreign partners is in fact a
national of a contracting state but it would seem that this should not
automatically make the choice of that partner's nationality a reasonable
one. It must, therefore, initially be determined whether A's influence is
sufficient to satisfy the "control" criterion in article 25(2)(b). Is the effect
any different, however, where this "control" is only a small part of the
total foreign influence on the locally incorporated enterprise in terms of
aggregate foreign shareholdings, business, and technical management
and where, if each foreign party's "control" is looked at in isolation, that
of the non-contracting state nationals appears greater?
On the one hand, to assume jurisdiction ratione personae over JV in
Example III would be to assume jurisdiction over the interests of nation-
als of non-contracting states, albeit not over those nationals themselves.
73 See Amerasinghe, supra note 36, at 232, 245.
74 Amerasighe, Submissions to theJurz~diction of the International Centrefor Settlement of Investment
Disputes, 5 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 211, 229, 230 (1974); Broches, supra note 10, at 337, 359, 361.
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This is open to the objections mentioned above in connection with Ex-
ample IV. On the other hand, to decline jurisdiction would deny protec-
tion to the interests of a national of a contracting state. The arguments
against the exercise of jurisdiction over nationals of non-contracting
states are not all applicable where the issue is the exercise of jurisdiction
over a national of the host in which nationals of non-contracting states
have an interest. In the former case, the non-contracting state of which
the party is a national is by definition not bound by article 27 and is
therefore not restricted from giving diplomatic protection or bringing an
international claim. This point will be elaborated on in the concluding
section of this paper. In the latter case there is no risk of this happening,
since the foreign controlled juridical person is by definition a national of
the host state party to the dispute and customary international law does
not yet countenance the protection of shareholders in such cases.75
Where nationals of contracting states clearly control the joint ven-
ture, the mere fact that nationals of non-contracting states have large
equity holdings in the venture, and even some control, should not be a
bar to jurisdiction. In such a case, the choice of nationality based on
foreign control is clearly reasonable. Where control is shared equally by
the foreign partners but none of them acting alone would have overall
control, it is not possible to predict the outcome with certainty. On the
specific facts of Example III, however, where B and C have collectively,
and even separately, more control than A, it is probable that a tribunal
would hold the choice of X nationality unreasonable. Again, however, it
is submitted that the host state party may be estopped from objecting to
jurisdiction on the grounds that the choice of nationality was unreasona-
ble, since it was itself a party to that choice.
These jurisdictional tangles may be obviated if B and C avoid classi-
ficatioh as nationals of non-contracting states by, prior to the agreement
between JV and host, arranging for their incorporation in state X or
another contracting state. On the other hand, even if B and C are incor-
porated in non-contracting states, there may be some connecting factor
with a contracting state, such as residence of a large percentage of share-
holders, which would enable them to stipulate that they are nationals of
the latter. As shown in section IV, the Centre is at liberty to accept a
relatively loose bond in satisfaction of the criterion of nationality under
the Convention and is by no means restricted to the principles enunci-
75 In Barcelona Traction, [1970] I.C.J. at 48, the court rejected the applicability to the facts
before it of a theory that protection could be exercised where a corporation has the nationality
of the very state responsible for the acts complained of. The tenor of the court's reasoning
clearly suggested that shareholders could only receive protection where the corporation has
ceased to exist in law. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 43, at 480. But note that several judges ex-
pressly supported this form of protection. Id. at 481. Moreover, protection of shareholders "at
international law" is recognized in the practice of certain countries. 2 D. O'CONNELL, supra
note 43, at 1043-44.
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ated by the ICJ of the Barcelona Traction case. 76
In the exact circumstances envisaged by Example III, however, it
would again be advisable for A to take the precaution of entering into a
separate agreement with the host in which the host agrees to submit to
ICSID any disputes arising out of the agreement between it and JV.
This expedient should be effective provided the host state consents to it;
it is no real disadvantage that JV will be dependent on A to institute
proceedings. The Convention does not require that the dispute arise di-
rectly out of an investment transacted solely between the parties to the
dispute. The use of the word "directly" in article 25(1) is clearly
designed to circumscribe the relationship between the dispute and the
investment, not the relationship of the party to the dispute with the in-
vestment. It is the nationality of the person party to the consent agree-
ment that is relevant, not the nationality of the investment.
C Changes in Identity of the Parties and Changes in Ownership and
Control within a Party
Changes in equity ownership of and control over joint ventures are
not infrequent, whether due to commercial expediency, a program of
planned and gradual divestment, or any other reason. May such changes
retroactively taint the stipulation in the consent agreement concerning
"nationality" and "foreign control" so as to deprive the parties of the
benefit of jurisdiction which would have existed had no changes taken
place? The situation where the identity of the investor party to the
agreement changes must be carefully distinguished from that where
there are changes of interest or control in that investor party.
(t) Change in Identity of a Party: Model Clause VII was drafted
to meet the contingency of a change in identity of the parties by provid-
ing explicitly for the inclusion of successors in interest within the jurisdic-
tional provision, thus binding the successor to the same extent as its
predecessor and assuring that the other party remains reciprocally
bound. 77 However, recognizing the possibility that a successor might be
unable to be a party to a proceeding before the Centre, for example if it
is a national of the host state or of a non-contracting state, the Clause
provides further for a preclusion of transfers in interest (absent the con-
sent of the other party) that would destroy the jurisdiction of the Centre.
The Clause would also apply to a transfer by the host government of its
76 [19701 ICJ. 1. The court effectively held that incorporation (or location of principal
office) is the sole criterion for corporate nationality.
77 Model Clauses, supra note 36, 17. Clause VII provides as follows: "It is hereby agreed
that the consent to jurisdiction of the Centre expressed in citation of basic clause above shall
equally bind any successor (in interest) to the name of constituent subdivision or agenc; and to
the Investor to the extent that the Centre can assume jurisdiction over a dispute between such
successor and the other party (and that neither party to this agreement shall, without written
consent of the other, transfer its interest in this agreement to a successor with respect to whom
the Centre could not exercise such jurisdiction)."
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interest under the investment agreement to local host state nationals.
Such a transfer is a practical possibility since it is generally considered
desirable from an economic development viewpoint for host state nation-
als to participate in local investments, particularly those involving secon-
dary industries. As capital markets in LDCs broaden with more
successful mobilization of domestic savings, host governments will, in
many cases, be keen to transfer their interests to private parties so that
scarce public funds can be channelled elsewhere. In light of this possibil-
ity, it may be advisable for investors, in addition to stipulating for mu-
tual consent to transfers in interest which may destroy jurisdiction, to
bargain for a further addition providing that, should such a transfer in
interest to local host state nationals occur, the host state will, notwith-
standing such change, guarantee the foreign investor's interest by further
legal instrument against government interference. Such guarantee
would be subject to ICSID jurisdiction; the host state government would
thus remain a party and jurisdict:ion would be preserved.
(ii) Changes in Ownership and/or Control within a Party: A different
situation is that where, although a joint venture incorporated in a host
state continues to be the foreign investor party to an investment agree-
ment with the host state, there are changes in ownership or control of
that joint venture. The language of the first part of article 25(2)(b), re-
garding enterprises which are nationals of contracting states other than
the host state, is unambiguous. So long as the juridical person had the
nationality of another contracting state on the date on which the parties
consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or arbitration, 78 the
Centre will have jurisdiction. Any changes in nationality after the date
of consent are irrelevant. 79 The following example shows that this prin-
ciple is easily applied and will facilitate analysis of the more complex
case of host state juridical persons agreed to be under foreign control.
Example V: Enterprise A, a national of Contracting State X, enters into
an investment agreement with the government of Contracting State H,
which agreement contains a clause consenting to ICSID arbitration.
Subsequent to the date of consent but prior to any dispute arising, A
becomes a national of non-Contracting State Y.
Clearly, when the dispute arises the Centre will have jurisdiction ratione
personae. Had A transferred its interest in the investment agreement to B,
a national of non-contracting state Y, jurisdiction would have been de-
stroyed. However, when the particular party to the agreement had, at
the date of consent, the nationality of a contracting state other than the
contracting state party to the agreement, jurisdiction over that party is
78 Art. 25(2)(b). ICSID Doc./4, Regulations and Rules, (B): Rule 2(1)(d)(i), provides
that requests for the institution of proceedings must indicate nationality as at the date of consent
(emphasis supplied).
79 " 'Date of consent' means the date on which the parties to the dispute consented in
writing to submit it to the Centre; if both parties do not act on the same day, it means the day
on which the second party acted." ICSID Doc./4, Regulations and Rules, (B): Rule 2(3).
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assured irrespective of subsequent changes in nationality. Now assume
that A's claim to X nationality was based on the fact that it was incorpo-
rated in X, had its siege social there, and that over 50% of the equity in A
was held by X nationals, the remainder being held by B enterprise. After
the date of consent but before a dispute arises B acquires all equity in A
held by X nationals and A moves its active headquarters to state Y. Ju-
risdiction is assured because there is no change in identity (the legal en-
tity A is still the party to the agreement) and the fact that A could be
held to have changed nationality is irrelevant.
In such circumstances, no matter how hypothetical they may be, the
distinction between identity and nationality can result in substance be-
ing surrendered to form. Nevertheless, the wording of the first part of
article 25(2)(b) leaves no room for argument. Subsequent changes of
capital structure or control of an enterprise may affect nationality but, as
long as the identity of the parties does not change, changes in nationality
after the date of consent are irrelevant.
To the extent that the matter is mentioned in the literature inter-
preting and discussing the Convention, there is universal agreement that
only the date of consent is relevant in determining the nationality of ju-
ridical persons for jurisdictional purposes.80 In the case of foreign con-
trolled host state juridical persons, it also appears that post-consent
changes in nationality and control are deprived of jurisdictional signifi-
cance. An example may be useful to analyze the possible absurdities
which would result from a formalistic application of this nationality re-
quirement.
Example VI: JV is incorporated in Host State. A, B, and C (foreign
enterprises being nationals of States X, Y and Z respectively) and L (one
or more private businessment in Host State) are the shareholders. State
X and, of course, Host, are Contracting States, but States Y and Z are
non-Contracting States. A holds 70% equity while B, C and L hold 10%
each. Voting rights are proportional to equity shares held. In 1978 JV
and Host enter into an agreement by which JV is to mine and refine
certain minerals. The agreement contains a consent clause submitting
disputes to ICSID and a stipulation that "although JV is a national of
Host it is controlled by nationals of State X and shall be treated as a
national of State X for the purposes of the Convention." In 1980 A
becomes a national of State Y. In 1982 A transfers half its equity in JV
to B and half to C so that the ratio is now B, 45%; C, 45%; L, 10%. In
1981, B and C each transfer almost all their equity to L so that the new
ratio is B, 2 1/2%; C, 2 1/2%; L, 95%. In 1986 a dispute arises between
JV and Host over the mining agreement.
According to the propositions discussed above, the Centre will have juris-
diction whenever the dispute arises since nationality is frozen at the date
of consent, at which time X nationality was chosen and was a reasonable
choice. All subsequent changes in nationality and control are irrelevant.
80 Szasz, supra note 10, at 20; Firth, The Law Governing Contracts in Arbitration under the World
Bank Convention, I N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 253, 257 n. 15 (1968); Amerasinghe, supra note 74,
at 229-230; BROCHES, supra note 10, at 358.
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Jurisdiction is not destroyed through a change in identity of the investor
party since JV is at all times the entity party to the agreement with host.
To take this analysis to its ultimate conclusion, even if at the time of a
request for registration of a dispute JV is wholly owned and controlled
by L, jurisdiction nonetheless exists, in the exact circumstances which
were sought to be avoided by the inclusion of the words "because of for-
eign control." It is inconceivable that such a situation should be consis-
tent with the "legislative intent" behind the Convention. The
proposition that for all juridical persons the nationality requirement is
frozen as at the date of consent is therefore inadequate.
The second part of article 25(2)(b) contemplates two separate na-
tionality requirements for two separate entities: the nationality of the lo-
cally incorporated juridical person and that of the controlling interest.
In these circumstances consideration of only one identity causes confu-
sion. To make coherent logic out of the provision with a view to the
situations in which it could plausibly be applicable, it is crucial to con-
sider separately the nationality and identity of the host state juridical
person and the nationality and identity of the controlling interest.
For the second part of article 25(2)(b) to apply it is necessary that
the juridical person concerned must in fact have been a national of the
host state, and that post-consent changes in the nationality of that same
juridical person would be deprived of significance by the wording of the
provision. The provision makes no express mention of and places no re-
strictions upon the nationality of the controlling interest. As explained
above, however, the article must be understood as implicitly requiring
that the stipulated nationality must constitute a reasonable choice as of
the date of consent.
Since the nationality of the controlling interest is of importance, it is
logical to hold, in harmony with the general requirements regarding na-
tionality of juridical persons which are nationals of other contracting
states, that post-consent changes in the nationality of the controlling in-
terest should be irrelevant but that total transfers of this interest to na-
tionals of non-contracting states, and afortion to host state nationals, will
destroy jurisdiction. It is submitted that this proposition calls for no
more distortion of the second part of article 25(2)(b) than does the propo-
sition that the article requires the agreement on foreign control to be
based upon a reasonable choice of nationality. This latter proposition is
logically essential and well supported.8 ' Both propositions merely give
effect to the view that, when considering host state corporate nationals
subject to "foreign control," significance must be attached to the nation-
ality of the controlling interest since that nationality is transposed onto
the host state juridical person. The wording of the second part of article
25(2)(b) easily accommodates an interpretation consistent with both of
these propositions.
81 See note 74 supra.
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Applying this interpretation to the facts of Example VI, if a dispute
were to arise in 1979, the Centre would clearly have jurisdiction since the
agreement on foreign control is based on a reasonable choice of national-
ity. If a dispute were to arise in 1981, the fact that A has become a
national of a non-contracting state would be irrelevant and the Centre
would nonetheless assume jurisdiction. However, the transfer of A's in-
terest to nationals of non-contracting states (B and C) in 1982 will result
in the Centre being unable to assume jurisdiction ratione personae over JV
with regard to disputes arising after this date.
It is submitted that this interpretation is necessary if the device sanc-
tioned by the second part of article 25(2)(b) to bring foreign-controlled
host state nationals within the scope of the Convention is not to be used
for purposes for which it was clearly not intended. It may therefore be
expected that tribunals and commissions will adopt this approach and
treat the two categories of juridical persons provided for by article
25(2)(b) with logical consistency.
Throughout this section, approaches to interpretation have been
suggested which are in accordance with the text of the Convention in the
context of its drafting history. The exclusion of nationals of non-con-
tracting states from the ambit of the Convention is well entrenched in
both the text and the preparatory work and in clear cut cases it cannot
be ignored. On the other hand, where the text of the Convention is si-
lent, there are strong reasons for the adoption of a lenient approach to
the presence of nationals of non-contracting states despite the legal policy
implicit in the jurisdictional articles. These reasons will be fully ex-
amined in the concluding section of this article.
VI. Conclusions and Overview
The World Bank Convention is a significant milestone towards the
protection and encouragement of foreign investment in developing coun-
tries. Foreign investors will gain considerable advantages by using it and
the facilities of the International Centre to the fullest permissible extent.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the rapidly increasing
number of foreign investors using the joint venture as a mechanism for
their business activities in developing countries will need to consider a
number of potential problems and issues and carefully structure their
agreements to ensure that these are arbitrable under the auspices of the
Centre.
The text of the Convention itself offers little definitional guidance
with respect to many of the operative terms employed in article 25. This
article has attempted to analyze these terms with a view to the situations
in which they might conceivably be applicable, suggesting certain ap-
proaches which are consistent with the fundamental principles of the
Convention as evidenced by its text and its drafting history.
The lack of definition arguably avoids restrictive criteria that would
214 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
too narrowly circumscribe the scope of the Convention, freeing the par-
ties to mold their own definitions within the confines of the Conven-
tion.82 With respect to certain issues, such as nationality and foreign
control, the agreement of the parties may cure jurisdictional weaknesses
that would otherwise exist. However, such agreement is not all-control-
ling. The determination of the exact limits beyond which such agree-
ment will no longer remedy jurisdictional defects causes some difficulty.
What is needed, therefore, are not hard and fast definitions but general
yet comprehensive guidelines regarding the scope of the Convention.
The Directors' Report is no substitute for these. ICSID awards are not
published without the consent of the parties8 3 and are therefore generally
unavailable, but it would be useful if the principles evolved and interpre-
tations adopted in decided disputes were made available for the gui-
dance of prospective users of the Centre.
There are certain situations, apart from the lack of definition, with
which the jurisdictional provisions as presently drafted are ill-equipped
to deal. This is strikingly illustrated by the problems that could arise
with regard to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over multipartite joint
ventures incorporated in host states. Where nationals of non-contracting
states have a sizeable interest in such ventures, or where there are
changes in ownership and control, article 25 provides no ready answers.
The conclusion is inescapable that insufficient thought, if any, was given
to the case of these joint ventures at the formulative stages of the Con-
vention.8 4 In view of the trend towards joint ventures as a mechanism
for investment, these are problems with which the Centre is likely to be
confronted in the future.
At the root of many of the problems examined in this paper is one of
the fundamental principles upon which the Convention is based-that of
the limitation of this instrument to contracting states and nationals of
these states. The exclusion of non-contracting states and their nationals
from the jurisdiction of the Centre is so axiomatic, so well-entrenched in
the text of the Convention and the travaux preparatoires thereof, that it
might be considered both an exercise in futility and a legal heresy to
challenge it. Certainly the reasons for the exclusion of non-contracting
states are obvious and compelling. Such states would, by definition, not
be bound to submit disputes to the Centre even after they had consented
to do so. The irrevocability of consent mandated by article 25(1), one of
the most remarkable features of the Convention, would be rendered
meaningless. Moreover, such states could ignore an award given against
them with virtual impunity, since they would not be bound by article
82 But see G. SCHWARZENBERGER, Supra note 6, at 142, who considers the lack of definition
a disadvantage.
83 Art. 48(5).
84 This was recognized by at least one of the legal experts and by the Chairman of the
Consultative Meetings considering the Preliminary Draft of the Convention. ICSID Doc./2
(part 1) 395.
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54(1). In effect, an investor who entered into an ICSID arbitration
agreement with a non-contracting state would be in no better position
than he would have been had the Convention not existed.85
The exclusion of nationals of non-contracting states from the juris-
diction of the Centre, however, is worthy of further examination. To
fully understand this exclusion, it may be helpful to emphasize the ra-
tionale behind the nationality requirement. The Convention is a deli-
cate balance of widely differing interests and has been drafted with what
has been referred to as "remarkable ingenuity. ' '8 6 It rests upon the quid
pro quo that, in return for the irrevocability of consent and the conse-
quent right to bind host states to arbitration or conciliation, investors
must forfeit, by virtue of article 27, the possibility of being afforded dip-
lomatic protection by their own states, unless and until the host state
party refuses to recognize an award. This balance would, it is argued, be
upset if non-contracting state nationals could bind contracting states to
proceedings, since the latter would have no guarantee that the national
state of the investor would not put forward an international claim in the
exercise of diplomatic protection.8 7 However, the implicit recognition by
the Convention of both incorporation and control as criteria of corporate
nationality and of dual nationality of enterprises where these criteria
lead to divergent conclusions reveals an interesting anomaly. Where a
contracting state is the national state of an investor enterprise according
to the ownership and control criterion, but a non-contracting state is its
national state according to the Barcelona Traction incorporation principle,
the contracting state is effectively prevented by article 27(1) from bring-
ing an international claim, against the host state party to the agreement
with the enterprise, but the non-contracting state is, by definition, sub-
ject to no such restriction.8 8
Fortunately, this problem is largely illusory since it appears to be an
established principle of international law that "where a state and an
alien agree to arbitrate disputes relating to a contract in terms that indi-
85 See section I supra. On September 27, 1978, the Administrative Council of the Centre
authorized the Secretariat to adminster certain proceedings which fall outside the Convention.
This "Additional Facility" is available to non-contracting states and their nationals who would
wish to use the facilities of the Centre to settle their disputes. See ICSID: Additional Facility for
the Administration of Conciliation, Arbitration and Fact-Finding Proceedings, ICSID Doc./ 1
(1979). While such a facility must be warmly welcomed as yet another improvement in the
international investment climate, the discussion of the jurisdictional provisions of the Conven-
tion undertaken in this study remains highly pertinent.
Since the users of the Additional Facility will be non-contracting states and their nationals,
the remarkable features of the Convention which make that instrument such an important ad-
dition to the international legal order will by definition not apply. See ICSID Doc./ 11, art. 3.
86 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 6, at 142.
87 Broches, supra note 10, at 356, 374.
88 In Barcelona Traction, the I.C.J. warned that "adoption of the theory of the diplomatic
protection of shareholders as such, by opening the door to competing diplomatic claims, could
create. . . confusion and insecurity." [1970] I.C.J., supra note 42, at 49. Ironically, art. 27 itself
could be ineffective in preventing a similar result under the Convention. In fact, it is the "ex-
haustion principle" that would prevent this result. See text infra.
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cate that this is to be the exclusive remedy, then that remedy must be
exhausted before an international claim can be maintained." 9 The ar-
bitral remedy is for this purpose the equivalent of local remedies. 90
This principle, however, exposes a paradox that strikes at the very
core of the rationale for the exclusion of nationals of non-contracting
states. If an investor having only the nationality of a non-contracting
state entered into an agreement with a contracting state and such agree-
ment were arbitrable-by ICSID, it is extremely unlikely that a claim by
the investor's state against the host state would succeed unless and until
the latter had failed to abide by and comply with the award rendered.
Indeed, such failure, by virtue of article 27(1) itself, removes the restric-
tion on contracting states from giving diplomatic protection or bringing
an international claim.9 '
Interpreted in this manner, article 27(1) appears merely declaratory
of the existing situation at customary international law. It has been inti-
mated, however, that the justification for this article is to be found in the
contention that where a host state, in defiance of a submission clause,
refuses to arbitrate at all, the investor could, in the absence of article
27(1), instantaneously invoke the protection of his national State.92
This argument is not convincing. Article 45(2) deals with the con-
tingency of a refusal of one of the parties to arbitrate and ensures that an
award will be given.93 In view of this, it is unlikely that even the most ill-
advised investor would abandon this machinery to seek the protection of
his national state, or that all but the most vindictive of states would seek
to bring an international claim before the procedures set in motion by
the Convention had been completed and an award obtained and not
complied with. Even if the non-contracting state of which the investor is
a national does attempt to bring an international claim directly after the
refusal of the host state to honor its agreement with the investor to arbi-
trate, before article 45(2) has been utilized, this attempt will not succeed.
The fact that the article 45(2) procedure exists, and that ICSID arbitra-
tion constitutes a complete institutional system, mandates this conclu-
sion. The failure of the investor party to avail himself of article 45(2)
and request an award despite the non-appearance of the host state party
must surely be held to mean that the arbitral remedy has not been fully
exhausted. 94 It is therefore submitted that the exclusion of nationals of
89 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 41, at 1059.
90 Schwebel & Wetter, Arbitration and the Exhaustion of Local Remedies, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 484
(1966).
91 Art. 27(l). See note 49 supra.
92 Broches, supra note 10, at 374-75.
93 Art. 45(2) provides as follows: "If a party fails to appear or to present his case at any
stage of the proceedings the other party may request the Tribunal to deal with the questions
submitted to it and to render an award. Before rendering an award, the Tribunal shall notify,
and grant a period of grace to, the party failing to appear or to present its case, unless it is
satisfied that that party does not intend to do so."
94 The argument that the investor's state could immediately maintain a successful claim
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non-contracting states cannot be adequately justified by reference to the
question of diplomatic protection. 95
The nationality requirement has been defended on a more substan-
tial ground. Article 54(1) enjoins contracting states to recognize an
award rendered pursuant to the Convention as if it were final judgment
of a court in that state. It has been argued that, in the absence of the
nationality requirement, the assurance provided by his article that host
states will be able to enforce awards in their favor could be frustrated if
the national state of the investor, where frequently his principal assets
will be located, is not a contracting state, and thus not bound to recog-
nize and enforce such awards.96 This possibility exists. Yet, even assum-
ing that such non-contracting states are not bound by some other treaty
obligation to recognize such awards, this is a slender justification for the
nationality requirement. More often than not the investor will, in addi-
tion, have assets in at least one contracting state and perhaps in the host
based on diplomatic protection when the host state refuses to participate in arbitral proceedings
is erroneous.
Broches, supra note 10, at 374 (quoting D. O'CONNELL, supra note 41, at 990) (emphasis
supplied by author) cites O'Connell in support of this argument, as follows:
Where a governmental contract contains an arbitration clause and the Con-
tracting State refuses to arbitrate, the latter is guilty of a denial of justice, just as
much as if it obstructed the contractor in his resort to the municipal law remedies
contemplated in the contractual relationship. Hence the private contractor may
instanty invoke the protection of his State ....
However, this passage from O'Connell continues directly with the words:
[Or, if the contract lays down suftient guidance as to the machinery of arbitration
• . . he may proceed to arbitration in the absence of the State and obtain an award.
D. O'CONNELL, supra note 41, at 990 (emphasis supplied). It is implied from the passage as a
whole, therefore, that the first part of it, as quoted by Broches, contemplates the situation where
there is no guidance as to the machinery of arbitration-indeed, no machinery at all. The latter
part of the passage is thus intended to reflect the situation where machinery does exist. It is
submitted that in this case protection may only be invoked if the refusing state ignores the
award, not merely the proceeding. Moreover, the sentences quoted above from O'Connell must
be seen in the context in which they were made. They were to stress that the arbitral remedy is
the equivalent of local remedies, so that when there is an arbitral remedy and this is frustrated
by the non-cooperation of the state the investor is not additionally required to exhaust local
remedies. See also Z. KRONFOL, PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 126 (1972) (emphasis
supplied): "If the private investor . . . seeks andfais to obtain the proceeding called for in his agree-
ment, he is under no obligation to exhaust local remedies. He is free, rather, to pursue the
resources open to him under international law." With respect to ICSID arbitration there is no
reason whatsoever why an investor should fail to obtain the proceeding. Article 45(2) sees to
that. D. O'CONNELL, supra note 41, at 1058 (quoting Lauterpacht, J., in the Norwegian Loans
Case, [1957] I.C.J. 9, at 39), states that "it is for the plaintiff State to prove that there are no
effective remedies to which recourse may be had." This would obviously be impossible if art.
45(2) had not been utilized by the investor. See note 93 supra.
95 If the investor could instantly invoke the protection of his state and the host state re-
fused to involve itself in the proceedings (though as has been shown above, this argument is
untenable), it must surely then be conceded that the potential conflict under art. 27(1), where
an enterprise has dual nationality, would be insoluble. This itself makes the rationale of diplo-
matic protection, upon which the principle of exclusion of nationals of non-contracting states is
squarely placed, a much less effective one.
96 Broches, supra note 10, at 356. Art. 54(1) provides that "[e]ach Contracting State shall
recognize an award rendered, pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary
obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court
in that State."
218 N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
state itself. Moreover, it must be remembered that host states are always
at liberty to refuse to consent to ICSID arbitration when the investment
agreement is negotiated. To refuse to allow them to consent to ICSID
arbitration with a national of a non-contracting state on the grounds
that they may obtain an award in their favor against an investor whose
assets are located only in his national state, which might refuse to enforce
such award, is an insufficient justification for the nationality require-
ment, especially in view of the potential problems this requirement poses.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the exclusion of nationals of
non-contracting states from the jurisdiction of the Centre is regrettable.
This feature of the Convention may be seen as an unfortunate by-prod-
uct of the inevitable political bargaining process in negotiating the final
draft rather than as a well reasoned necessity based upon sound legal
policy. This is not in any way to underrate the "remarkable ingenuity"
97
with which the Convention has been drafted, or the inestimable value of
its contribution to a more secure and conducive climate for foreign in-
vestment and economic development, but merely to caution that
problems of interpretation in connection with this aspect of the national-
ity requirement are likely to arise.
The temptation to urge an amendment to the Convention to give
the Centre jurisdiction over nationals of non-contracting states must be
tempered by an understanding of the formidable task that faced the for-
mulators of the Convention in producing an instrument that attracted
such a broad membership in the first place. No matter how logical and
compelling the reasons for amendment may be, it would be naive to
expect that such amendment would be readily adopted by every con-
tracting state.98 For the foreseeable future, then, the nationality issue
must be coped with as best as possible. One may express hope, indeed
confidence, that in situations such as those discussed in this article, a
liberal approach will be adopted to the fullest extent possible within the
confines of the Convention.
97 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 6, at 142.
98 The procedure for amending the Convention is specified in art. 66(1):
If the Administrative Council shall so decide by a majority of two thirds of its
members, the proposed amendments shall be circulated to all Contracting States
for ratification, acceptance or approval. Each amendment shall enter into force
30 days after dispatch by the depositary [sic] of this Convention of a notification
to Contracting States that all Contracting States have ratified, accepted or ap-
proved the amendment.
